Post by SpazPost by Peter MulloyThey were quite happy to supply as many weapons as possible to Iran during
the early 1980s, despite Iran (at the time) being one of the most extreme
Islamist countries on the planet. Their logic was to keep the Iraq/Iran war
going for as long as possible.
The haters lose AGAIN.
Indeed, Israel's plan to back Iran has kind of back fired.
Post by SpazProof? Didn't think so... duuuuuuuuhhhhhhh
The Iran-Iraq War: Strategy of Stalemate
CSC 1985
SUBJECT AREA History
WAR SINCE 1945 SEMINAR
The Iran-Iraq War:
Strategy of Stalemate
Major Robert E. Sonnenberg, USMC
1 Apri1 1985
Marine Corps Command and Staff College
Marine Corps Development and Education Command
Quantico, Virginia 22134
ABSTRACT
Author: Sonnenberg, Robert E., Major USMC
Title: The Iran-Iraq War: Strategy of Stalemate
............ As it turns out, the Arab saying, "The enemy of my enemy
ismy friend," has been applied to the Iran-Iraq war. Israel,worried
about Iraq and the Arab world, began supplying Iran withU.S. manufactured
weaponry and spare parts. It was in Israel'sbest interest to distract
Iraq, who has a stated Baathistobjective of defeating the Israelis.
Syria, in an effort todiscredit Iraq and assume the role as the most
powerful Baathiststate, also began supplying Iran with Soviet made
weaponry.15 The Regional Problem Fears of an
expanded war have been intense in other Gulfstates. Given the stated
intent of Khomeini's revolution to be aholy crusade throughout the Islamic
world, the other Gulf statesdo not want to become drawn into the war,
since it would obviouslydestroy their economies. Overt support for either
side is alsoout of the question, as taking sides could have serious
reprisalimplications should the other side win. Yet, it would seem that
the Gulf states might have supportedIraq before Iran. In fact, Saudi
Arabia underwrites a greatportion of the Iraqi war expense. Kuwait
openly supported Iraquntil they were bombed by Iran, a warning not only to
Kuwait butto all other regional onlookers. To support each other and
provide some semblance of security,the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) was
established in 1981. Ithas worked very well by expressing political
solidarity. The sixmember nations are Saudi Arabia, Qatar, the United Arab
Emirates,Kuwait, Oman, and Bahrain.16 Superpower
Involvement Both superpowers, the United States and the Soviet
Union,were caught off-guard by the start of the war. The United States,of
course, had been attempting to solve the hostage crisis sincebefore the
war started and was not on friendly terms with Iran.And, the U.S. had not
had diplomatic relations with Soviet backedIraq since 1968. The Soviets
had not been welcomed in Iran by theShah, and were tied down in Afghanistan.
Khomeini, a religiousfanatic, was definitely not willing to deal with
the Soviets.When Iraq invaded, the Soviets immediately stopped
supplyingweapons since Iraq had not consulted them concerning the
attack.The Soviet Union did, however, sign a treaty of 'peace
andfriendship' with Iraq after the war began and has been
supplyingweaponry ever since. It would seem that neither superpower has
any desire to seeeither side win the war. The balance of power in the
region is atstake and a decision remains delicately poised. When the
warstarted, both superpowers calculated that it would be
overquickly, at which time they could influence the winners
andlosers. A wait-and-see attitude prevailed, and, as the worldwaited,
the war continued with less and less chance of superpowerinvolvement.
Both superpowers are, of course, interested in the outcome ofthe war. But
intervention is ruled out because of potentialescalation and
confrontation. The wait-and-see attitude will mostlikely continue until
there is an end to the fighting, at whichtime both the U.S. and the
Soviet Union could be expected to makea move.17 United
States Interest The most important U.S. concern in the Gulf is oil,
thoughthis is not the sole concern. In 1973, Western Europe derived
60percent of its oil, and Japan 90 percent, from Gulf suppliers. In1984,
these figures were about 40 and 60 percent respectively.The U.S. gets
only about 3 percent of its oil from the PersianGulf.18 Because of
this heavy supply of oil to alliedcountries, keeping the oil flowing
has become a vital interest tothe United States. Of primary concern,
then, is keeping the Strait of Hormuzopen to shipping. Khomeini
threatened closure of the Strait whenIraq started shooting at tankers, but
has not yet attempted thisdrastic step. Oil production seems to have
continued at arelatively even pace with no serious degradation since
the warbegan. Though Iraq has continued to shoot at tankers in the
Gulf,driving insurance rates up, there is no shortage of vessels
andvoluntary crews to transit the Strait.19 The U.S. has three major
policy objectives with respect tothe current Gulf crisis. One is to
prevent disruption of oilshipments that would cause serious hardship for
Western economies.Another is to ensure the security of oil-producing
governments inthe area that have been friendly to the West and have
resistedSoviet expansionism in the Gulf. And lastly, the U.S. would liketo
ensure that whatever the outcome of the war, the Soviet Unionwould not
have a dominant position in either country.20 The Carter Doctrine of
1980 addressed the stated intention ofthe U.S. to intervene militarily in
the region if the shipment ofoil was halted or curtailed.21 President
Reagan, in aFebruary 22, 1984 press conference, also said that the U.S.
iscommitted to keeping the Strait of Hormuz open.22 Keepingfriends in the
area is vitally important for the prosecution of amilitary campaign. And,
the U.S. is taking steps to defuse Sovietinfluence in Iraq; diplomatic
relations were renewed with theopening of embassies in both countries
in December 1984.23Iraq had been removed from the "anti-terrorist" list
in early1982, opening the way for renewed relations.24
Chapter 3 - Footnotes 1Evans, "Iran-Iraq: Bloody Tomorrows," p. 33.
2Staudenmaier, "Military Policy and Strategy in theGulf," p. 28.
3Evans, "Iran-Iraq: Bloody Tomorrows," p. 34. 4Ibid., p. 36.
5Cordesman, "Lessons of the Iran-Iraq War: The FirstRound," p. 47.
6Kelly, "Battling for the Advantage," p. 35. 7Evans, "Iran-Iraq: Bloody
Tomorrows," p. 37. 8Drew Middleton, "Will Iran's 'Vietnam' Be
Khomeini'sDownfall," Navy Times, February 11, 1985, p. 23. 9Hickman,
Ravaged and Reborn: The Iranian Army, p. 18. l0Cordesman, "Lessons of
the Iran-Iraq War: Part Two,"p. 73. 11Ibid., p. 74. 12Ibid.
13Evans, "Iran-Iraq: Bloody Tomorrows," p. 40. 14Ibid. 15William E.
Smith, "A Quest for Vengeance," Time, July26, 1982, p. 21. 16Michael
Sterner, "The Iran-Iraq War," Foreign Affairs,Fall 1984, p. 141.
17"Iran-Iraq: Bloody Tomorrows," p. 40. 18Sterner, "The Iran-Iraq War,"
p. 138. 19Ibid., p. 139. 20Ibid., p. 140. 21Grummon, "The
Iran-Iraq War: Islam Embattled," p. 88 22Daly, "The Not-too Forgotten
War," p. 38. 23Don Oberdorfer, "U.S., Iraq Resume Diplomatic
Ties,"Washington Post, November 27, 1984.